{
  "id": "2002-february-security-problems",
  "slug": "2002-february-security-problems",
  "url": "https://dwillis.github.io/uplink/article/2002-february-security-problems.html",
  "year": 2002,
  "month": "February",
  "monthNum": 2,
  "headline": "Security problems",
  "kicker": "SPOTLIGHT: TERRORISM",
  "author_name": "Paul D'Ambrosio",
  "author_title": "",
  "affiliation": "Asbury Park Press",
  "summary": "A journalist describes using CAR techniques and FAA security databases to report on security lapses at Newark Airport following 9/11, despite severe technological constraints and communication challenges. By focusing on specific security violation codes in the FAA database, the reporter was able to quickly identify critical security failures that became relevant to the investigation.",
  "keywords": [
    "security",
    "database",
    "airport"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Investigative Methods",
    "Public Safety",
    "Data & Databases"
  ],
  "technologies": [],
  "full_text": "As news organizations scrambled to produce special editions Sept. 11, CAR writers and editors were faced with reporting under some of the most difficult circumstances possible.\n\nWhile the unfolding news changed from minute to minute, communication overloads at the Asbury Park (N.J) Press and perhaps other news outlets around New York City put a crimp in our usual tools of the trade. Telephone connections were sporadic and, worse, our Internet service was down more than it was up. Our on-site, online servers were overwhelmed with perhaps 10 times as many page views as normal.\n\nEven the day after, it took more than three hours to download the latest FAA security data from NICAR - a 25-meg database that would normally slide through our pipeline within minutes.\n\nThe delay pushed the first story about weak security at Newark International Airport right up to our 8 p.m. deadline. I had never used the security data before, but was familiar with FAA terminology and mindset, having written several stories on the administration in the late 1990s.\n\nThere were two key tasks: use the database to elicit reaction from airline officials, and find real people to tell their tales of security lapses.\n\nZeroing in with data\n\nIn the database, I focused on the SECURITY table, one of four in the FAA data. Pressed for time, I focused exclusively on Newark airport, the departure airport for United flight 93 the flight that crashed in a Pennsylvania field.\n\nAfter quickly scanning the security code violations at Newark (coded by its common call letters, EWR) I zeroed in only on two security issues: mock weapons making their way through checkpoints, and unauthorized personnel entering air operation areas, or AOAs. The latter are supposedly secure sites to prevent those bent on destruction from tampering with the aircraft itself.\n\nBoth areas were a critical concern since at that point, no one knew how the hijackers got their box cutters or knives on board.\n\nI used security codes C111, and C130 to C139, which focused on security officers failing to detect weapons during undercover tests. A131 and A132 also gave me counts on unauthorized access to AOAs. The FAA cited United Airlines four times in 1999 for screening violations, but only issued warning letters.\n\nBlackout limitations\n\nUnited and the FAA had imposed a media blackout, so no more information about the lapses could be learned that night. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which owns Newark Airport, provided some background on how security in the terminals worked.\n\nThe data had limitations. There was no way to know how many times airport security was tested, so no rate could be developed to compare one facility with another. But, recent Inspector General and General Accounting Office reports confirmed security was a major problem at airports around the county, which added depth to the story.\n\nWe also found a local resident who told of walking onto two empty planes just a month before the hijackings. She contacted me after reading our first story. She said she was appalled at the lack of security, which was so lax that an airline worker even helped her get onto one aircraft.\n\nHer experience led to a second story the next day about people entering the sterile air operations areas. The data was again helpful in that area since AOA violations were well noted.\n\nPaul D'Ambrosio can be reached by e-mail at pmd@app.com",
  "provenance": {
    "extracted_by": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6",
    "extracted_at": "2026-07-05",
    "verified": true
  },
  "similar": [
    {
      "slug": "2002-february-putting-together-the-data-puzzle",
      "score": 0.486
    },
    {
      "slug": "2002-february-poor-airport-security",
      "score": 0.476
    },
    {
      "slug": "2001-novemberdecember-airport-insecurity",
      "score": 0.466
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    {
      "slug": "2002-february-meeting-the-data-challenge",
      "score": 0.432
    },
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  ],
  "html_url": "https://dwillis.github.io/uplink/article/2002-february-security-problems.html",
  "json_url": "https://dwillis.github.io/uplink/article/2002-february-security-problems.json"
}