{
  "id": "2002-february-meeting-the-data-challenge",
  "slug": "2002-february-meeting-the-data-challenge",
  "url": "https://dwillis.github.io/uplink/article/2002-february-meeting-the-data-challenge.html",
  "year": 2002,
  "month": "February",
  "monthNum": 2,
  "headline": "Meeting the data challenge",
  "kicker": "SPOTLIGHT: TERRORISM",
  "author_name": "Justin Mayo and David Heath",
  "author_title": "",
  "affiliation": "The Seattle Times",
  "summary": "The Seattle Times investigated airport security at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport following the 9/11 attacks by analyzing FAA enforcement data, conducting interviews, and requesting incident reports to provide context on security violations and system vulnerabilities.",
  "keywords": [
    "security",
    "airport",
    "violations"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Public Safety",
    "Investigative Methods",
    "Data & Databases"
  ],
  "technologies": [],
  "full_text": "In just a couple of hours, 19 hijackers shattered public confidence in airport security. Even officials at the Federal Aviation Administration, who make the rules and monitor airport security, were so unsure of the system's ability to prevent further hijackings that they kept airlines grounded for three days.\n\nSo it was natural for newspapers to ask how safe airports are.\n\nThe Seattle Times began looking for information on Seattle-Tacoma International Airport security immediately. The data available through the FAA's Enforcement Information System had serious limitations. What's more, the agency was of little help and in some cases even hostile in our efforts to understand the data.\n\nTo supplement this data, we also requested all security incident reports at the airport for two years. We also interviewed employees and managers at airport screening companies, experts at the General Accounting Office and Transportation Department's Inspector General's office and former FAA security officials.\n\nFinding context\n\nThe database lists each individual violation of FAA security rules, including the name of the offender, the name of the airport, the date, a description of the violation and what actions were taken for the past 20 years. FAA hires inspectors to test screeners and those violations were listed as \"failure to detect\" various types of weapons.\n\nWe first used the database for a Sept. 12 story, culling general statistics on the number of security violations and proposed penalties for airlines from the database.\n\nBut it was apparent that there was much more local detail, especially in the descriptions of security violations committed by airports and airlines. The problem was how to interpret it and put it in context without the benefit of knowledgeable sources willing to talk.\n\nFinding a focus\n\nThe mechanics of analyzing the FAA enforcement data are straightforward.\n\nTo find security violations, you link the Main table, which contains basic data on the violator and when and where the violation occurred, to the Security table, which has distinct violations for each incident. Then, link to the Actions table to find the FAA's response, including civil penalties, warning letters, certificate revocation, etc.\n\nEarly on you have to decide how you're going to define a \"security violation.\" One incident from the Main table could contain several security violations or actions. We decided to focus on incidents, not violations. That meant that if a loaded gun were found in a checked bag, which is against FAA rules, it was counted only once even though the agency may have issued several citations for failing to declare the weapon, illegally storing ammunition and improperly packing a gun.\n\nThe main challenge, however, was deciding which security violations to focus on. There are about 250 distinct security codes that airports, airlines, passengers or mechanics could be cited for violating. Most were cryptic, such as failure to detect \"encap weapon.\" We were unable to decipher that description before our deadline.\n\nTo narrow our scope we looked at weapons violations.\n\nThe enforcement data can be divided into two broad categories of weapons violations: those where the security system failed and those where it worked. In the Security table the \"failure to detect\" codes show where airline screeners let FAA inspectors slip test weapons through undetected. These failures are detailed by date, airline, type of test weapon and in many cases even the specific concourse where the violation occurred. We used these failures to document problems at the Seattle-Tacoma airport and to show how many test objects - pipe bombs, hand grenades, pistols the screening system let through.\n\nFinding answers\n\nWe decided against comparing Seattle's results to other airports because at that time we had no way tell how frequently the FAA tested each airport. We were concerned that FAA inspectors in some jurisdictions might be more diligent than in others, making comparisons impossible.\n\nWe knew from the book Flying Blind, Flying Safe by former DOT Inspector General Mary Schiavo that Sea-Tac screeners had detected explosive devices only 12 percent of the time in tests - one of the worst performances in the nation.\n\nThe data show the security system working when real weapons are discovered, usually because a passenger fails to declare a gun in a checked bag or has one in their carry-on. Guns were frequently discovered in checked bags at Sea-Tac, even though few checked bags are put through X-ray machines or bomb-detection devices. We used these violations to calculate the number of firearms found at major airports and computed a rate based on domestic enplaned passengers. Sea-Tac ranked second in the country in 1999.\n\nSupplementing the enforcement data, local police records and other sources showed that the FAA seriously underreports incidents involving weapons. Port of Seattle records showed gun violations, mostly minor, occurring almost every day at the airport - everything from a passenger failing to disclose that a weapon has been stored in a checked suitcase to trying to walk through the metal detector with a concealed handgun strapped to an ankle holster.\n\nFinding sources\n\nBesides reporting the data, we interviewed a 38-year-old screener, Teuila Tuitele, who said that the training she received inadequately prepared her for the job. She had some classroom training during her first week and passed a multiple-choice test asking how she should handle irate passengers or what to do if she detected a weapon on the X-ray machine. She was shown and tested on how to identify suspicious bomb-like shapes. She said screeners needed only an 85 percent detection rate to get assigned a job.\n\nIt is not uncommon for a screener to sit at the X-ray machine for two or even three hours without a break. \"Sitting there more than 30 minutes you fall asleep,\" Tuitele said. \"It's like watching the TV.\"\n\nJustin Mayo can be reached by e-mail at jmayo@seattletimes.com",
  "provenance": {
    "extracted_by": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-6",
    "extracted_at": "2026-07-05",
    "verified": true
  },
  "similar": [
    {
      "slug": "2001-novemberdecember-airport-insecurity",
      "score": 0.51
    },
    {
      "slug": "2002-february-poor-airport-security",
      "score": 0.487
    },
    {
      "slug": "2002-february-comparing-foot-traffic",
      "score": 0.451
    },
    {
      "slug": "2002-february-security-problems",
      "score": 0.432
    },
    {
      "slug": "2002-february-fighting-the-airport",
      "score": 0.405
    }
  ],
  "html_url": "https://dwillis.github.io/uplink/article/2002-february-meeting-the-data-challenge.html",
  "json_url": "https://dwillis.github.io/uplink/article/2002-february-meeting-the-data-challenge.json"
}